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1Abstract. We study price formation in securities markets, using the sequential trade framework of Glosten
and Milgrom [7]. This paper makes one basic methodological advance over previous research on sequen-
tial securities trading: we allow for multiple trade sizes for traders to choose from in a multi-period market.
We examine how trade size multiplicity affects the intertemporal dynamics of trading strategies, bid-ask
spreads, and information revelation. We also show that price impact, as a function of trade size, is increas-
ing and exhibits (discrete) concavity.
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21 Introduction
Market microstructure studies the price formation process, and how this process is affected by the orga-
nization of the market. The main objective of this paper is to understand how trade sizes affect the price
formation process dynamically within an environment where traders can choose from multiple trade sizes.
There are two standard reference frameworks in the market microstructure theory. One is the con-
tinuous auction framework, ﬁrst developed by Kyle [13]. The other is the sequential trade framework,
introduced by Copeland and Galai [4] and Glosten and Milgrom [7]. Both frameworks are sufﬁciently
simple and well-behaved that they easily lend themselves to analysis of policy issues and empirical tests.1
Although most markets are organized as in the sequential trade models, these models tend to be less
tractable than the Kyle model as Back and Baruch [2] point out.2
In this paper, we adopt the sequential trade framework to study the relationship between price, trade
size, and information. Sequential trade models consider markets where a risky asset is traded between a
market maker, strategic traders and liquidity traders. First, the market maker, who is not informed of the
risky asset payoff, quotes the bid and ask price. Then either a strategic trader or a liquidity trader arrives
at the market in a random manner. The liquidity trader’s trading motive is not related to the risky asset
payoff at all. Whereas the strategic trader has information on the risky asset payoff, hence her trades reveal
information. In the model of Copeland and Galai [4], the risky asset payoff becomes public information
after each trade. In the Glosten and Milgrom [7] model, trading goes on for many rounds. Therefore, the
latter allows us to see how price compounds information over time. Glosten and Milgrom [7] also show
that the bid-ask spread declines in expectation, and that the spread eventually vanishes almost surely as the
number of trading rounds tends to inﬁnity.
One of the simpliﬁed assumptions in Glosten and Milgrom [7] is that traders can only trade one share
at any given period. Easley and O’Hara [6] extend the Glosten-Milgrom model by allowing for two
trade sizes: one small and one large. By doing so, they theoretically justify the empirically observed
phenomenon that block trades are made at “worse” prices than small trades. However, Easley and O’Hara
[6] do not truly focus on the dynamic process of price formation as they restrict their analysis to one and
then two trading rounds within their paper.
Our model extends the models of Glosten and Milgrom [7] and Easley and O’Hara [6] in two direc-
tions: time and trade size. We extend Glosten and Milgrom’s [7] model by allowing for multiple trade
sizes for traders to choose from. Also, in comparison to Easley and O’Hara [6], we are not conﬁned in our
analysis to two trade sizes or two trading rounds. In our model, both trade sizes and trading rounds can be
1See Madhavan [14] and Biais, Glosten and Spatt [1] for extensive surveys of the literature.
2In a continuous time setup, Back and Baruch [2] show that the equilibrium of the Glosten-Milgrom model is approximately
the same as the equilibrium of the Kyle mode, when the trade size is small and uninformed trades arrive frequently.
3arbitrarily many.
The main contribution of this paper is to examine how trade size (i.e. trading volume) affects the
intertemporal dynamics of trading strategies, bid-ask spreads and information revelation. In particular, we
establish the following results. In each period there is a positive cutoff trade size for the informed trader
who observes that the risky asset payoff is high. She assigns no probability to purchasing amounts below
this trade size while assigning positive probability to each trade size above the cutoff. The situation is
symmetric for the informed trader who observes that the risky asset payoff is low: there is a positive least
amount that she sells with positive probability, and she assigns positive probability to selling each allowed
amount greater than this cutoff. The bid-ask spreads exist only in the trade sizes where informed trading
is considered probable by the market maker. The cut-off trade sizes for the informed traders can decrease
over time, and small trade sizes initially with zero bid-ask spreads can later have positive spreads. We also
prove a couple of asymptotic results comparable to those of Glosten and Milgrom [7]: the market maker
learns the true risky asset payoff almost surely as the number of trading rounds tends to inﬁnity, and the
bid-ask spreads vanish in the limit. Finally we show that the price impact,3 as a function of trade size, is
increasing and exhibits (discrete) concavity. The ﬁnal result is supported by empirical evidence.
The organization of our paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the model and the equilibrium concept.
In Section 3, we present the equilibrium analysis and our results. Section 4 concludes. Most of the proofs
are delegated to the appendix.
2 The Model
We consider a market in which potential buyers and sellers trade a risky asset with a competitive market
maker. The economy lasts for T + 2 many periods. The periods are indexed by t = 0,1,...,T,T + 1.
Trade takes place in periods t = 1,...,T and consumption of a single good in period T + 1. The risky
asset pays off in period T + 1. The risky asset payoff ˜ v takes values from the set {0,V } with the prior
probability Pr(˜ v = 0) = δ. We assume that V > 0 and 0 < δ < 1.
There are three types of agents in the economy: informed traders, liquidity traders and a competitive
market maker. Informed traders are risk neutral, and they try to maximize their expected proﬁts by trading.
Informed traders also know the realization of the risky asset payoff ˜ v. Liquidity traders trade according to
their liquidity needs, which are exogenous to the model. The competitive market maker supplies against
the demands of informed traders and liquidity traders.
Traders can choose from multiple trade sizes when they are trading the risky asset. In particular, they
can trade the risky asset in the trade sizes which are elements of the set Ωn := {−n, ..., −1, 0, 1, ..., n}.
In our notation, k and −k represent the purchase and the sale of k units of the risky asset, respectively.
3Price impact is the absolute value of the price change caused by the latest trade.
4Ω+
n := {1, ..., n} denotes the set of possible purchase trade sizes while Ω−
n := {−n, ..., −1} denotes the
set of possible sales trade sizes. 0 represents no trade.
The timing of events in our model is as follows:
1. In period 0, nature chooses the realization v ∈ {0,V } of the risky asset payoff ˜ v. Informed traders
observe v.
2. In successive periods, indexed by t = 1,...,T, the events realize in the following order:
  Having observed the realized trades in periods 1,...,t−1, the competitive market maker posts
a price for each trade size in Ωn.
  A new trader (either an informed trader or a liquidity trader) arrives at the market and learns
market maker’s price quote for each trade size.
  If the trader is informed, she takes the proﬁt-maximizing quote. If the trader is a liquidity
trader, she trades in the trade size determined by her liquidity needs.
3. In period T + 1, the realization of ˜ v is publicly disclosed, and consumption takes place.
The type of the trader arriving in period t is determined by the random variable ˜ θt which takes values
from the set {iv,l}. The letters, iv and l, denote the informed type and the liquidity type, respectively.
The random variables {˜ θt : t = 1,...T} are i.i.d. across the periods 1,...,T and satisfy Pr(˜ θt = iv) =  .
If the trader type in period t is l, then the demand at that period is determined by the random variable ˜ Lt
which takes values from Ωn. The random variables {˜ Lt : t = 1,...,T} are i.i.d. and satisfy Pr(˜ Lt = q)
= γ(q) > 0. Also, for any given period t, the random variables ˜ θt, ˜ Lt, ˜ v are mutually independent.
We assume that informed traders, who trade once, gets the chance to re-trade with probability 0. Thus,
informed traders behave myopically and they (rationally) ignore the effect of their trades on future periods.
The market maker is risk-neutral and her price quotes make her zero expected proﬁt in each period,4 i.e.
in period t, t = 1,...,T, she chooses the price of each trade size q ∈ Ωn equal to the expected value of
the risky asset payoff conditional on her information at period t and the trade realization being equal to
q. Informed traders and market maker correctly anticipate each other’s trading and pricing strategies. The
structure of the economy, described so far, is common knowledge.
Next we describe the details with regard to market maker’s pricing strategy and informed traders’
trading strategy. To that end, we ﬁrst need to introduce some notation. Let qt denote the trade size that
the market maker receives in period t, i.e. qt is the realized trade size for period t. A period-t history
ht := (q1,...,qt) is the sequence of realized trade sizes for periods up until t+1. The space of all possible
4A Bertrand competition among market makers is the standard assumption to have zero expected proﬁt for the (competitive)
market maker.
5period-t histories, t ≥ 1, is denoted by Ωt
n :=
 t
τ=1 Ωn, and ht is taken to be the generic element of
Ωt
n. hT ∈ ΩT
n is called a complete history. ht is said to be consistent with hT = (q1,...,qT) ∈ ΩT
n if
hT = (ht,qt+1,...,qT). For notational convenience, we let h0 = ∅. Also, we let πt : Ωt−1
n × Ωn → R
represent the market maker’s pricing strategy function (i.e. her price menu for all trade sizes) so that
πt(ht−1,q) is the market maker’s price quote for trade size q given history ht−1.
Since there is a price quote for each trade size, it is possible for informed traders to obtain the same
proﬁt from two or more different trade sizes. In such cases, informed traders assign positive prob-
abilities to those trade sizes that yield equal proﬁt when they determine their demands. We formal-
ize this as follows: In our model, a trading strategy is a probability function ψ : Ωn → [0,1] such
that
 









ψ : Ωn → [0,1]
 
  
q∈Ωn ψ(q) = 1
 
denote the set of all possible trading strategies. Informed
trader’s trading strategy for price menu πt prescribes a probability distribution ψt(v,ht−1,πt) ∈ ∆(Ωn)
over trade sizes in Ωn for each v ∈ {0,V } and history ht−1 ∈ Ωt−1
n . We let ψt(q|v,ht−1,πt) denote
the probability assigned to trade size q by the probability distribution ψt(v,ht−1,πt). Among all trading
strategies, the informed trader chooses the strategy which maximizes her expected proﬁt given the market
maker’s price menu. Therefore, informed trader’s optimal trading strategy for price menu πt prescribes
the probability distribution ψ∗
t(v,ht−1,πt) ∈ ∆(Ωn) over trade sizes in Ωn for each v ∈ {0,V } and
history ht−1 ∈ Ωt−1
n such that
ψ∗




ψ(q)[q (v − πt(ht−1,q))].
The market maker is Bayesian. She updates her belief about the risky asset payoff in each period after
having observed the realized trade size for that period. Formally, δt(ht−1,q) is the probability assigned
by the market maker to the risky payoff being equal to 0 given that realized history is ht−1 ∈ Ωt−1
n and
the realized trade size in period-t is going to be q. As a notational convenience, we let δ0 = δ. Bayesian
updating dictates
δt(ht−1,q) := Pr(˜ v = 0|ht−1,q)
=
Pr(˜ v = 0|ht−1) [ ψt(q|0,ht−1,πt) + (1 −  )γ(q)]
 
v∈{0,V } Pr(˜ v = v|ht−1) ψt(q|v,ht−1,πt) + (1 −  )γ(q)
(1)
if the market maker believes that informed trader is employing trading strategy ψt in period-t. As the
market maker makes zero proﬁt from her price quotes, her price menu πt satisﬁes
πt(ht−1,q) = (1 − δt(ht−1,q))V, ∀ht−1 ∈ Ωt−1
n , ∀q ∈ Ωn. (2)
We say that πt(ht−1,q) satisﬁes the zero-proﬁt condition if equation (2) holds.
Next we deﬁne the equilibrium for our economy:
6Deﬁnition 1 Anequilibrium consists ofmarket maker’s price menus {π∗
t : t = 1,...,T}, informed trader’s
trading strategies {ψ∗
t : t = 1,2,...,T}, and posterior beliefs {δ∗
t : t = 1,2,...,T} such that for all
t ∈ {1,    ,T} and for all ht−1 ∈ Ωt−1
n
(P1) π∗
t(ht−1,q) satisﬁes the zero-proﬁt condition (2) given the posterior belief δ∗
t(ht−1,q) for all q ∈ Ωn,
(P2) ψ∗
t(v,ht−1,π∗
t) is informed trader’s optimal trading strategy for price menu π∗
t for all v ∈ {0,V },
(B) for all q ∈ Ωn,
δ∗
t (ht−1,q) =
Pr(˜ v = 0|ht−1) [ ψ∗
t(q|0,ht−1,π∗
t) + (1 −  )γ(q)]
 
v∈{0,V } Pr(˜ v = v|ht−1) ψ∗
t(q|v,ht−1,π∗
t) + (1 −  )γ(q)
.
Condition (B) speciﬁes the equilibrium belief. It essentially reﬂects two critical assumptions of our
model: ﬁrst, market maker is Bayesian; second, informed traders and market maker correctly anticipate
each other’s trading and pricing strategies.5
Finally, wedeﬁne thebid-ask spread for trade sizeq: theperiod-t bid-ask spread for history ht−1 ∈ Ωt−1
n
and trade size q ∈ {1,...,n} is given by
St(ht−1,q) := πt(ht−1,q) − πt(ht−1,−q), (3)
where πt is the market maker’s price menu.
3 Sequential Trades with Multiple Trade Sizes
Our analysis makes one basic methodological advance over previous research on sequential trade models:
we let traders choose from multiple trade sizes. This allows us to see the impact of trade size on price
menus, trading strategies, and information revelation in a multi-period economy.
3.1 Informed Traders’ Equilibrium Trading Strategies
We ﬁrst examine the impact of trade size on trading strategies. To that end, we analyze informed traders’
equilibrium trading strategies. The following proposition lists some of the basic properties of the equilib-






t) : t = 1,....,T
 
isanequilibrium, then forall ht−1 ∈ Ωt−1
n andt ∈ {1,...,T}
informed traders’ equilibrium trading strategy ψ∗
t satisﬁes the following:
(a) ψ∗
t(0|v,ht−1,π∗
t) = 0 for all v ∈ {0,V },
5In other words, informed traders and market maker have rational expectations about each other’s strategies.
7(b) ψ∗
t(q|V,ht−1,π∗




t) = 0 for all q ∈ Ω+
n.
Part (a) of Proposition 1 states that informed traders always trade in non-zero quantities. This is simply
a consequence of the information asymmetry between informed traders and the market maker. Since the
market maker can never fully infer the risky payoff realization v at any given period t < ∞ due to the
presence of liquidity traders, informed traders, who know v, are better off trading non-zero quantities of
the risky asset as they can make non-zero proﬁts by doing so. Parts (b) and (c) say that informed traders
sell when v = 0 and buy when v = V , respectively. Since the market maker always quotes a price strictly
between 0 and V (due to her uncertainty about the risky asset payoff), informed traders are better off
selling when they know v = 0 and they are better off buying when they know v = V .
The next result shows that informed traders’ equilibrium trading strategies satisfy a special condition:
given any history and period, there is a cut-off trade size above which informed traders buy with positive
probabilities ifv = V and another cut-off size above which informed traders sell with positive probabilities






t) : t = 1,....,T
 
is an equilibrium, then for all ht−1 ∈ Ωt−1
n and t ∈ {1,...,T}
there exist cut-off trade sizes k+
t (ht−1) ≥ 1 and k−




t (ht−1),    ,n}, and
supp{ψ∗
t (0,ht−1,π∗
t)} = {−n,    ,−k−
t (ht−1)}.
Theorem 2 essentially says the following: if informed traders assign positive probability to trade size
q in their equilibrium trading strategy, then they also assign positive probabilities to trade sizes larger than
q. The key to this result lies in the fact that informed traders’ equilibrium trading strategies affect the
market maker’s price menu. If there were a uniform price per share, then an informed trader, who makes
a proﬁt by trading q shares, would make higher proﬁts by trading more than q shares. However, in our
differential pricing setup, when informed trader wants to buy more than q shares, say q + x, x ≥ 1, she is
given a “worse” price quote by the market maker. How much worse the price quote will be is determined
by the market maker’s belief on how likely she thinks q + x shares will be traded by an informed trader.
Therefore, informed traders would like to assign a positive probability to the larger trade size, q + x, so
that the proﬁt they make by trading on the larger trade size, q + x, at a worse price would equal the proﬁt
they make by trading on the smaller trade size, q, at a better price. Existence of such a positive probability
essentially implies that both q and q+xare in the support of informed traders’ equilibrium trading strategy,
and Theorem 2 proves that this positive probability exists.






t ) : t = 1,....,T
 
be an equilibrium. The equilibrium trading strategy of
informed traders, ψ∗
t, is said to be
  k partially pooling on the long side for history ht−1 if 0 < ψ∗
t(q|V,ht−1,π∗
t) ≤ 1 for all
q ∈ {k,k + 1,...,n} and ψ∗
t(q|V,ht−1,π∗
t) = 0 for all q ∈ {0,...,k − 1},
  k partially pooling on the short side for history ht−1 if 0 < ψ∗
t(q|0,ht−1,π∗
t) ≤ 1 for all
q ∈ {−n,−n − 1,...,−k} and ψ∗
t(q|0,ht−1,π∗
t) = 0 for all q ∈ {0,...,−k + 1}.
According to this simple classiﬁcation, Theorem 2 implies that there exist k+
t and k−
t such that informed
traders’ equilibrium trading strategy is k+
t partially pooling on the long side and k−
t partially pooling on
the short side. For convenience, we also employ the following terminology: we say ψ∗
t is
  separating on the long side (short side) for history ht−1 if ψ∗
t is n partially pooling on the long side
(short side) for history ht−1,
  completely pooling on the long side (short side) for history ht−1 if ψ∗
t is 1 partially pooling on the
long side (short side) for history ht−1.
We now turn our attention to the necessary and sufﬁcient conditions for informed traders’ equilibrium






t ) : t = 1,....,T
 




t partially pooling on the long side for history ht−1 if and only if











γ(i) + (1 − δ∗
t−1(ht−1))  > 0, and (4a)











γ(i) + (1 − δ∗
t−1(ht−1))  ≤ 0, (4b)
(b) k−
t partially pooling on the short side for history ht−1 if and only if












t−1(ht−1)  > 0, and (4c)











t−1(ht−1)  ≤ 0. (4d)
9To better understand the implications of Proposition 3, we examine the necessary and sufﬁcient condi-
tions for the two special cases of k partially pooling trading strategies: separating and completely pooling.






t ) : t = 1,....,T
 
be an equilibrium. The equilibrium trading strategy of
informed traders, ψ∗
t, is






γ(n)(1 −  )
, (5a)






γ(−n)(1 −  )
. (5b)
In the case of separating trading strategies, traders trade only in the largest trade size, namely n. Ob-
serve that, for separating trading strategies, conditions (4a) and (4c) in Proposition 3 become redundant as,
for k+
t = k−
t = n, these conditions reduce to (1−δ∗
t−1(ht−1))  > 0 and δ∗
t−1(ht−1)  > 0, respectively,
which necessarily hold since the market maker can never fully infer the risky payoff realization v at any
given period t or history ht−1 due to the presence of liquidity traders (meaning that 0 < δ∗
t−1(ht−1) < 1).
This observation and straightforward manipulations on (4b) and (4d) prove Corollary 4.
Now let us focus on the implication of this result. Corollary 4 implies that as the probability   of
informed trading goes upan equilibrium trading strategy becomes less likely tobe separating. Theintuition
is straightforward: Following Theorem 2, informed traders always assign positive probability to the largest
trade size n in their equilibrium trading strategies. If the probability of informed trading is high, then the
market maker posts a large bid-ask spread for trade size n to avoid loss inﬂicted by informed traders.
This makes trading in the largest trade size less attractive for informed traders, hence they decrease their
likelihood of trading in size n by assigning positive probabilities to smaller trade sizes in their trading
strategies. Therefore, an equilibrium trading strategy is less likely to be separating if the probability of
informed trading is high.
The following result provides the necessary and sufﬁcient conditions for equilibrium trading strategies






t ) : t = 1,....,T
 
be an equilibrium. The equilibrium trading strategy of
informed traders, ψ∗
t, is
(a) completely pooling on the long side for history ht−1 if and only if
(1 −  )
n  
i=1
(1 − i)γ(i) + (1 − δ∗
t−1(ht−1))  > 0, (6a)
10(b) completely pooling on the short side for history ht−1 if and only if
(1 −  )
n  
i=1
(1 − i)γ(−i) + δ∗
t−1(ht−1)  > 0. (6b)
In the case of completely pooling trading strategies, informed traders trade in all possible trade sizes
with positive probabilities. Therefore, conditions (4b) and (4d) in Proposition 3 are redundant, and the
result above is obtained as a straightforward corollary of Proposition 3.
Note the following implication of Corollary 5: as the probability of informed trading   increases in-
formed traders’ equilibrium trading strategy becomes more likely to be completely pooling. The intuition
behind this result is very much in line with the intuition we gave for Corollary 4. Following Theorem 2,
the market maker knows that informed traders are more likely to trade in large trade sizes and as a conse-
quence she posts large bid-ask spreads for these large sizes. This makes informed traders to assign positive
probabilities to smaller trade sizes so that they can enjoy “better” price quotes. Essentially, increased pool-
ing gives informed traders increased coverage by liquidity traders against the market maker. Therefore, if
the probability of informed trading is sufﬁciently high, the equilibrium trading strategy of informed traders
is completely pooling.
3.2 Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium
In the standard sequential trade models, traders, who trade once, get the chance to re-trade with probability
zero. This is also the case in our model. Therefore, informed traders’ time scope for portfolio decisions is
conﬁned to one period. As a consequence, the only link between consecutive periods is the market maker’s
belief on the risky asset payoff. That is, δ∗
t−1 is the only parameter from period-(t−1), which the period-t
equilibrium strategies π∗
t, ψ∗
t and the period-t equilibrium belief δ∗
t depend on. Let us demonstrate this in
detail:
Take a complete history hT ∈ ΩT
n, and let {ht : t = 1,...,T} be the sequence of histories consistent














Equation (7) shows the functional relation between the period-t equilibrium belief δ∗
t (ht−1, ) : Ωn → R
and the period-(t − 1) equilibrium belief δ∗
t−1(ht−1). Also, the zero-proﬁt condition of the equilibrium,
namely (P1), dictates that the market maker’s price menu is of the form
π∗














11Equation (8) shows the functional relation between the period-t price menu π∗
t(ht−1, ) : Ωn → R and
δ∗
t−1(ht−1). Finally, the functional relation between informed traders’ period-t equilibrium trading strate-
gies ψ∗
t( ,ht−1,π∗
t) : {0,V } → R|Ωn| and δ∗
t−1(ht−1) is derived in Lemma 1.6 It states that if ψ∗
t is k+
t
partially pooling on the long side and k−


























: q ∈ {k+








0 : q ∈ {−k−


















: q ∈ {−n,    ,−k−
t }.
(9b)
So far, we have been able to derive the period-t equilibrium strategies and belief solely as a function
of δ∗
t−1(ht−1). It is easy to check that δ∗




n as these inequalities span the whole space of real numbers. Also, the inequalities (4a)-(4d)
are mutually exclusive across different values of k+
t and k−
t . All these imply that, given δ∗
t−1(ht−1), there
exist period-t equilibrium strategies π∗
t,ψ∗
t and period-t equilibrium belief δ∗
t, and they are uniquely iden-
tiﬁed by the equations (7), (8), (9a)-(9b). Note that the same argument applies to all periods t ∈ {1,...,T}
and histories ht−1, and since δ0 = δ is an exogenous parameter of the model the overall equilibrium of the
economy can be derived in a recursive fashion, using (7), (8), (9a)-(9b). In summary we have proven the
following result:





t) : t = 1,....,T
 
. That is, given a complete
history hT ∈ ΩT
n, the sequence of histories {ht : t = 1,...,T} consistent with hT, and t ∈ {1,...,T},
the equilibrium price menu π∗
t(ht−1, ) : Ωn → R, the equilibrium trading strategy of informed traders
ψ∗
t( ,ht−1,π∗
t) : {0,V } → R|Ωn|, and the equilibrium posterior belief δ∗
t(ht−1, ) : Ωn → R uniquely
exist.
3.3 Equilibrium Dynamics
In this section we turn our attention to the equilibrium dynamics. First, we examine the dynamics of the
equilibrium trading strategies of informed traders. As trades unfold over time, the market maker updates
her belief on the risky asset payoff. Consequently, she also updates the price menu, and in turn informed
traders revise their trading strategies. Given a k partially pooling trading strategy in period-t, the revision
of the trading strategy in period-(t+1) can take place in two ways: (1) informed traders can maintain k as
6See Appendix.
12the cut-off size and just change the probabilities they assign to trade sizes over k, or (2) they can alter the
cut-off size, hence change the support of their trading strategy. Naturally, the latter implies a signiﬁcant
change in the trading behavior of informed traders, and that is what we are after: we would like to see if







t) : t = 1,....,T
 




t partially pooling on the long side and k−
t partially pooling on the short side for history ht−1. Also, let
ψ∗
t+1 be k+
t+1 partially pooling on the long side and k−
t+1 partially pooling on the short side for history ht.
(a) k+
t+1 < k+





































































For the sake of exposition, we call {k+,...,n} the domain of informed purchasing, {−n,...,−k−} the
domain of informed selling, and {−n,...,−k−} ∪ {k+,...,n} the domain of informed trading if the equi-
librium trading strategy is k+ partially pooling on the long side and k− partially pooling on the short side
for the given history and period. Proposition 7 reveals the following: (a) the domain of informed purchas-
ing gets bigger in period-(t + 1) provided that the probability   of informed trading is sufﬁciently high, a
trade from the period-t domain of informed purchasing has occurred, and the market maker believed that
the risky asset payoff was highly likely to be 0 before the purchase realization; (b) the domain of informed
selling gets bigger in period-(t+1) provided that the probability   of informed trading is sufﬁciently high,
a trade from the period-t domain of informed selling has occurred, and the market maker believed that the
risky asset payoff was highly likely to be V before the sale realization.
Part (a) and part (b) of Proposition 7 can be motivated in similar fashions. Let us consider part (a).
Suppose that the probability   of informed trading is sufﬁciently high, a trade from the period-t domain
of informed purchasing has realized, and the market maker believed that the risky asset payoff was highly
likely to be 0 before the purchase realization. An informed purchase would take place only if the risky




t partially pooling on the long side for history ht−1 and






















t . This result follows in a fairly straightforward manner from the updating rule (1) and Proposition 3.
13asset payoff were V . Since the probability of informed trading is high and the market maker previously
believed that the risky asset payoff was highly likely to be 0, the realized purchase leads to a signiﬁcant
change in her belief. If informed trading strategy were not to be revised in period-(t + 1), the market
maker would substantially increase prices for the period-t domain of informed purchasing. Consequently,
the period-t domain of informed purchasing would yield lower proﬁts in period-(t + 1). Therefore, if
the true risky asset payoff is indeed V , informed traders revise their trading strategy by decreasing the
cut-off size. By doing so, they increase the probability of liquidity trading within the domain of informed
purchasing and this allows higher probability of proﬁt-making for the market maker. As the market maker
is bound to make zero expected proﬁt in equilibrium, the enlarged domain of informed purchasing yields
more favorable price quotes for the informed traders.
As illustrated by the argument above, the dynamics of informed trading strategies and the market
maker’s learning process are closely related. We next tackle whether the market maker’s belief on the
risky asset payoff converges to the truth as the number of trading periods tends to inﬁnity. Glosten and
Milgrom [7] show that such convergence is obtained almost surely if the only available trade size is the
unit trade size. In our generalized framework, where multiple trade sizes are available, the asymptotic
result of Glosten and Milgrom [7] still holds.





t ) : t = 1,....,∞
 
be an equilibrium. Given a complete
history h∞ ∈ Ω∞
n , let (ht : t = 1,...,∞) be the sequence of histories consistent with h∞.
(a) δ∗
t (ht) converges to 0 almost surely as t tends to inﬁnity if v = V ,
(b) δ∗
t (ht) converges to 1 almost surely as t tends to inﬁnity if v = 0.
This result is driven by the fact that transaction prices (i.e. the prices of trade sizes that have been acted
upon) form a martingale. The martingale property of prices guarantees their convergence. Of course, even
if the beliefs converge, they need not converge to the truth. However, as in Glosten and Milgrom [7], after
sufﬁciently high number of periods, the market maker observes sufﬁcient number of informed trades, and
these trades reveal the truth in the limit.
3.4 Bid-Ask Spreads
In this section, we investigate the equilibrium bid-ask spreads. The bid-ask spreads compensate the market
maker for the risk of doing business with informed traders. Therefore the equilibrium bid-ask spreads
depend on informed traders’ equilibrium trading strategies: positive bid-ask spreads are observed only in







t) : t = 1,....,T
 
be an equilibrium. Also, let ψ∗
t be k+
t partially pooling
on the long side and k−
t partially pooling on the short side for history ht−1. The equilibrium bid-ask
spread S∗
t (ht−1, ) : Ω+
n → R satisﬁes the following:
(a) S∗
t (ht−1,q) > 0 if and only if min{k+
t ,k−
t } ≤ q ≤ n,
(b) S∗
t (ht−1,q) = 0 if and only if 1 ≤ q < min{k+
t ,k−
t }.
Notice that small trade sizes initially with zero bid-ask spreads can later have positive spreads as the
trades unfold over time. This actually follows from Proposition 9 and our discussions in Section 3.3.
Section 3.3 has revealed that informed traders can enlarge the domain of informed trading over time as a
remedy against the market maker getting close to the truth. In light of Proposition 9, this means that the
domain of positive bid-ask spreads will get bigger over time if the domain of informed trading is indeed






t) : t = 1,....,T
 
be an equilibrium. Also, let ψ∗
t be k+
t partially pooling on
the long side and k−
t partially pooling on the short side for history ht−1.
(a) If k+
t ≤ k−
t , qt ≥ k+
t , and δ∗
t(ht−1,qt) satisﬁes (10a), then
S∗
t (ht−1,k+
t − 1) = 0 while S∗
t (ht,k+
t − 1) > 0.
(b) If k−
t ≤ k+
t , qt ≤ −k−
t , and δ∗
t(ht−1,qt) satisﬁes (10b), then
S∗
t (ht−1,k−
t − 1) = 0 while S∗
t (ht,k−
t − 1) > 0.
The bid-ask spreads exist due to the asymmetric information between the market maker and informed
traders. If the market maker were to learn the truth about the risky asset payoff, there would be no spreads
as the price of the risky asset would be set equal to its payoff. So, following Theorem 8, we know that the
bid-ask spreads vanish almost surely as the number of trading periods tends to inﬁnity.





t ) : t = 1,....,∞
 
be an equilibrium. Given a complete
history h∞ ∈ Ω∞
n , let (ht : t = 1,...,∞) be the sequence of histories consistent with h∞. The equilibrium
bid-ask spread S∗
t (ht) converges to 0 almost surely as t tends to inﬁnity.
Finally, we would like to examine the functional relation between bid-ask spreads and trade sizes. To
that end, we ﬁrst make the following mathematical deﬁnition. Let X ∈ Z. We say f : X → R exhibits
discrete concavity if, for any x,x − 1,x + 1 ∈ X, it holds that
f(x + 1) − f(x) ≤ f(x) − f(x − 1). (11)
15f is said to exhibit strict discrete concavity if (11) holds with strict inequality. Notice that our deﬁnition
for discrete concavity essentially provides an extension of the concavity deﬁnition of continuous functions
to discrete spaces. Recall that a differentiable function is concave if and only if its ﬁrst order derivative is a
decreasing function. In a discrete space, this corresponds to ﬁrst order difference being a decreasing func-
tion, as in (11). The following proposition sheds light on the functional relation between the equilibrium
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be an equilibrium. Also, let ψ∗
t be k+
t partially pooling
on the long side and k−
t partially pooling on the short side for history ht−1. The equilibrium bid-ask
spread S∗




Proposition 12 reveals that the equilibrium bid-ask spread, as a function of trade size, isstrictly increas-
ing and exhibits strict discrete concavity within the domain of trade sizes where both informed purchasing
and informed selling are deemed probable by the market maker.
In Hasbrouck’s [11] empirical study, it is shown that large trades cause bid-ask spread to widen. This
empirical ﬁnding is consistent with our results. Theorem 2 suggests that large trade sizes are likely to be in
the domain of informed trading. Also, Proposition 12 implies that the bid-ask spread, as a function of trade
size, is strictly increasing within the domain where both informed purchasing and informed selling are
considered probable by the market maker. Therefore, Theorem 2 and Proposition 12 together suggest that
large trades are likely to be associated with a widening of the bid-ask spread. Furthermore, Hasbrouck [11]
notes that the widening in the spread after a large trade is temporary. This ﬁnding can also be justiﬁed by
our model. As large trades are likely to be in the domain of informed trading, they lead to the market maker
updating her posterior belief. Theorem 8 shows that the market maker gets close to the truth regarding the
risky asset payoff after a sufﬁciently number of periods. Hence, bid-ask spreads are eventually bound to
vanish, as indicated by Proposition 11. Consequently, the widening in the spread can only be temporary.
3.5 Price Impact
The last notion to be examined in our equilibrium analysis is the price impact. Price impact measures the
absolute impact of trade size on the risky asset price. Formally, the period-t price impact of trade q ∈ Ωn
for history ht−1 ∈ Ωt−1
n is given by
It(ht−1,q) = |πt(ht−1,q) − πt−1(ht−1)|. (12)
Hasbrouck’s [11] estimates for a sample of NYSE suggests that price impact, as a function of trade
size, is increasing and concave. Moreover, this concavity is quite typical of all the stocks in his sample.






t ) : t = 1,....,T
 
be an equilibrium. Also, let ψ∗
t be k+
t partially pooling
on the long side and k−
t partially pooling on the short side for history ht−1.
(a) The equilibrium price impact I∗
t (ht−1,q), as a function of trade size |q|, is increasing and exhibits
discrete concavity.
(b) The equilibrium price impact I∗
t (ht−1,q), as a function of trade size |q|, exhibits strict discrete
concavity in the domain {−n,...,−k−
t } ∪ {k+
t ,...,n}.
This result follows from two basic equilibrium properties: (1) only a transaction in the domain of
informed trading leads to a change in the market maker’s posterior belief, hence a change in her price
menu, (2) given the market maker’s price menu, all transactions in the domain of informed trading yield the
same expected proﬁt (if a transaction yielded a lower expected proﬁt compared to others, informed traders
would not have made that transaction in equilibrium). The ﬁrst equilibrium property implies that the
equilibrium price impact of trade q equals zero if q is outside the domain of informed trading. The second
equilibrium property implies that informed traders’ expected proﬁt, (v − π∗
t(ht−1,q))q, is same over all
trades, q, within the domain of informed trading. Consequently, period-t equilibrium price π∗
t(ht−1,q) is
proportional to −1
q within the domain of informed trading. This in turn implies that the equilibrium price
impact, as a function of trade size |q|, is increasing and exhibits discrete concavity.
4 Concluding Remarks
To quote an old adage in the Wall Street, “it takes volume to move prices”. This paper investigates the
relationship between trade sizes and the dynamic process of price formation. Following Glosten and
Milgrom [7] and Easley and O’Hara [6], we assume that the response of asset prices to trading activity is
a consequence of asymmetric information. Our theoretical study reveals the following:
1. In each period there is a positive cutoff trade size for the informed trader who observes that the risky
asset payoff is V . She assigns no probability to purchasing amounts below this trade size because,
even at the price induced by the market maker’s priors, such trades cannot capture her equilibrium
information rents. She assigns positive probability to purchasing the cutoff trade size, by deﬁnition.
In equilibrium any positive trade size that she assigns zero probability to is priced according to the
market maker’s priors, so she must assign positive probability to each trade size above the cutoff
because otherwise purchasing the cutoff trade size would be suboptimal. The situation is symmetric
for the informed trader who observes that the risky asset payoff is 0. There is a positive least amount
that she sells with positive probability, and she assigns positive probability to selling each allowed
amount greater than this cutoff.
172. Bid-ask spreads exist only in the trade sizes where informed trading is deemed probable by the
market maker.
3. The cut-off trade sizes decrease following atrade provided that the trade leads toa substantial change
in the market maker’s belief. Consequently, the domain of trade sizes, where informed trading is
deemed probable by the market maker, can get bigger over time. Therefore, small trade sizes initially
with zero bid-ask spreads can later have positive spreads.
4. The market maker learns the true risky asset payoff almost surely as the number of trading rounds
tends to inﬁnity. Hence, the bid-ask spreads are eventually bound to vanish.
5. The bid-ask spread, as a function of trade size, is strictly increasing and exhibits strict (discrete)
concavity within the domain where both informed purchasing and informed selling are deemed
probable by the market maker. Also, the price impact, as a function of trade size, is increasing and
exhibits (discrete) concavity. Both results are consistent with Hasbrouck’s [11] empirical ﬁndings.
There are a number of directions in which our theoretical study can be furthered. One of them is
to introduce price discreteness. Numerous empirical studies tackle the dynamics of discrete bid and ask
quotes and investigate the impact of tick size reduction (i.e. price decimalization) on market quality.8
Another possible extension is to allow for re-trading: as in Glosten and Milgrom [7], traders re-trade
with probability zero in our current model. Chakraborty and Yilmaz [3] show that there is room for
manipulation when re-trading is allowed and the information structure is enriched.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. (a) Suppose ψ∗
t(0|V,ht−1,π∗
t) > 0 for some t ≥ 1 and ht−1 ∈ Ωt−1
n . Then we
have
0 ≥ (V − π∗
t(ht−1,q))q = δ∗
t(ht−1,q)V q, ∀q ∈ Ωn. (13)
Following (1), 0 < δ∗
t(ht−1,q) < 1 as the probability of liquidity trading is positive over all trade sizes.
Therefore inequality (13) fails to hold when q ∈ Ω+
n. This proves that ψ∗
t(0|V,ht−1,π∗
t) = 0 for all t ≥ 1
and ht−1 ∈ Ωt−1
n . In a similar fashion, it can be easily proved that ψ∗
t(0|0,ht−1,π∗
t) = 0 for all t ≥ 1 and
ht−1 ∈ Ωt−1
n .
(b) Suppose there exist t ≥ 1 and ht−1 ∈ Ωt−1
n such that ψ∗
t(q|V,ht−1,π∗
t) > 0 for some q ∈ Ω−
n.
Then it must hold that
(V − π∗
t(ht−1,q))q ≥ 0. (14)
8See Goldstein and Kavajecz [8], Harris [9], [10], and Hasbrouck [12].
18However, since 0 < δ∗




t(ht−1,q)V q < 0.
This contradicts with (14).
(c) The proof is similar to that of (b). ￿
Proof of Theorem 2. Suppose there exists an equilibrium {(π∗
t,ψ∗
t,δ∗
t ) : t = 1,...,T} such that for some
t ≥ 1, ht−1 ∈ Ωt−1
n , and i,j ∈ Ω+
n with i > j
ψ∗
t(j|V,ht−1,π∗
t) > 0, ψ∗
t(i|V,ht−1,π∗
t) = 0.
Then it must hold that
(V − π∗
t(ht−1,j))j ≥ (V − π∗
t−1(ht−1,i))i.

















i < 1 and ψ∗
t(j|V,ht−1,π∗
t) > 0 by assumption, (15) fails to hold. This proves that there exists
k+
t (ht−1) ∈ Ω+
n such that supp{ψ∗
t(V,ht−1,π∗
t)} = {k+
t (ht−1),    ,n}. In a similar fashion, it can be
proved that supp{ψ∗
t(0,ht−1,π∗
t)} = {−n,    ,−k−
t (ht−1)} for some k−
t (ht−1) ∈ Ω−
n. ￿
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be an equilibrium. Also, let ψ∗
t be k+
t partially pooling on
the long side and k−
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(16b)
Proof of Lemma 1. As ψ∗
t is k+
t partially pooling on the long side for history ht−1, ψ∗
t(q|V,ht−1,π∗
t) = 0
for q ∈ {1,    ,k+
t − 1}. Now let q ∈ {k+
t ,...,n}. The equilibrium deﬁnition imposes that
q[V − π∗
t(ht−1,q)] = i[V − π∗
t(ht−1,i)], ∀i ∈ {k+
t ,...,n}, (17a)
q[V − π∗
t(ht−1,q)] ≥ i[V − π∗
t(ht−1,i)], ∀i ∈ {0,1,    ,k+
t − 1}. (17b)








, ∀i ∈ {k+
t ,...,n}.





















Summing left and right hand side of (18) over i ∈ {k+




































t) with 1 − ψ∗
t(q|V,ht−1,π∗

























Hence, equation (16a) is obtained. Equation (16b) can be obtained in a similar fashion. ￿
Proof of Proposition 3. (a) Suppose ψ∗
t is k+
t partially pooling on the long side for history ht−1. This
means ψ∗
t(q|V,ht−1,π∗
t) > 0 for q ∈ {k+
t ,...,n} and ψ∗
t(q|V,ht−1,π∗
t) = 0 for q  ∈ {k+
t ,...,n}. Hence,
following Lemma 1, the inequalities (4a) and (4b) must hold.
Now suppose the inequalities (4a) and (4b) hold. Following Theorem 2, there exists some K such that
ψ∗
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As ψ∗
t is K partially pooling on the long side for ht−1, it must be true that








γ(i) + (1 − δ∗
t−1(ht−1))  > 0,








γ(i) + (1 − δ∗
t−1(ht−1))  ≤ 0.
20Since the inequalities (4a) and (4b) hold, we have k+
t = K. This proves that ψ∗
t is k+
t partially pooling on
the long side for history ht−1.
(b) The proof is similar to that of (a). ￿
Proof of Proposition 7. (a) Let (10a) hold and qt be from the domain {k+
t ,...,n}. Assume to the contrary
that kt+1 ≥ kt. Since ψ∗
t+1 is kt+1 partially pooling on the long side for history ht = (ht−1,qt), from
Proposition 3 we have










γ(i) + (1 − δ∗
t(ht−1,qt))  ≤ 0. (20)
As kt+1 ≥ kt, from (20) we obtain










γ(i) + (1 − δ∗
t(ht−1,qt))  ≤ 0. (21)
Since ψ∗
t is k+
t partially pooling on the long side for ht−1, by Proposition 3, the inequalities (4a)- (4b) also
hold. (4a) and (21) together yield





























Given that qt ∈ {k+
t ,...,n}, The inequality above, (1), and Proposition 1 imply






























(22) contradicts (10a). Therefore, it must hold that kt+1 < kt.
(b) The proof is similar to that of (a). ￿
Proof of Theorem 8. Let H∞ denote the sigma ﬁeld generated by all the possible histories h∞. We con-
sider the market maker’s equilibrium belief as a stochastic process, which we denote by {δt : t = 1,...,T}.
Following a theorem in Fristedt and Gray [5] (Theorem 3, p. 432), there exists a unique distribution over
δt conditional on (δ0,    ,δt−1). Therefore, the collection of probability distributions {δt : t = 1,...,T}
and the probability space (Ω∞
n ,H∞,P) are well-deﬁned. Notice that δt is a martingale with respect to the
market maker’s information set. By the martingale convergence theorem, δt converges almost surely to a
random variable ˆ δ. Next we prove that ˆ δ = 0 if v = V and ˆ δ = 1 if v = 0. Let v = V and suppose to the
contrary that there exists a period τ and histories h′
t such that for all t ≥ τ
Pr(h′
t : |δt(h′
t) − p| > ǫ) = 0 (23)
21for some p ∈ (0,1] and arbitrary small ǫ. Following Theorem 2, for all t ≥ τ there exists some k+
t such
that informed traders’ equilibrium trading strategy ψ∗
t is k+
t partially pooling on the long side for history
h′
t−1. By (1), if a trade larger than k+
τ+1(h′
τ) realizes in period-(τ + 1), the market maker’s belief δτ+1
deviates from the interval of [p − ǫ,p + ǫ]. Formally,
Pr(h′
τ+1 : |δτ+1(h′
τ+1) − p| > ǫ) = Pr(h′
τ : |δτ(h′










which contradicts with (23). Therefore, it must hold that ˆ δ = 0. It can be similarly shown that ˆ δ = 1 if
v = 0. ￿
Proof of Proposition 9. From (1), (2), and Lemma 1, we have
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If 1 ≤ q < min{k−
t ,k+




t) = 0 and consequently (24) yields
S∗
t (ht−1,q) = 0. If min{k−
t ,k+





hence (24) yields S∗
t (ht−1,q) > 0.
On the other hand, if S∗





t) = 0 and this together with Lemma 1 implies 1 ≤ q < min{k−
t ,k+
t }. If S∗
t (ht−1,q) >




t)} > 0, which together
with Lemma 1 implies min{k−
t ,k+
t } ≤ q ≤ n. ￿
Proof of Proposition 11. The result immediately follows from (24) and Theorem 8. ￿
Proof of Proposition 12. From Lemma 1 and (24), we have
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if q ≥ max{k−
t ,k+
t }. The result immediately follows from (25). ￿
Proof of Proposition 13. Using (1), (2), and Lemma 1, we derive the following:
22  if q  ∈ {−n,...,−k−
t } ∪ {k+
t ,...,n}, then
I∗
t (ht−1,q) = 0; (26a)
  if q ∈ {k+
t ,...,n}, then
I∗




















  if q ∈ {−n,...,−k−
t }, then
I∗
































The results immediately follow from (26a), (26b), and (26c). ￿
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